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Reconsidering the Taxation of
Foreign Income
JAMES R. HINES JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
A policy of taxing worldwide income on a residence basis holds
enormous intuitive appeal, since if income is to be taxed, it would
seem to follow that the income tax should be broadly and uniformly
applied regardless of the source of income. Whether or not worldwide
income taxation is in fact a desirable policy requires analysis ex-
tending well beyond the first pass of intuition, however, since the con-
sequences of worldwide taxation reflect international economic
considerations that incorporate the actions of foreign governments
and taxpayers. Once these actions are properly accounted for, world-
wide taxation starts to look considerably less attractive. Viewed
through a modern lens, worldwide income taxation by a country such
as the United States has the effect of reducing the incomes of Ameri-
cans and the economic welfare of the world as a whole, prompting the
question of why the United States, or any other country, would ever
want to maintain such a tax regime.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the consequences of taxing
active foreign business income,1 and in particular, to compare a re-
* Richard A. Musgrave Collegiate Professor of Economics and Professor of Law,
University of Michigan. This Article draws on earlier work with Mihir Desai, to whom I
am grateful for comments and for many stimulating discussions of these topics. I also
thank Rosanne Altshuler, Alan Auerbach, Mitchell Kane, Martin McMahon, Daniel
Shaviro, Stephen Shay, Michael Smart, and various seminar participants for many helpful
comments on earlier drafts.
I Worldwide income taxation typically includes the taxation of individual incomes, but,
in the interest of tackling one issue at a time, this Article puts the specific considerations
that apply to individual income tax implications of worldwide taxation and territoriality
aside for a more propitious moment. As a practical matter, worldwide taxation of business
income by the United States is much more consequential in the sense of revenue collected
and burdens imposed than is U.S. worldwide taxation of individual income. As one indica-
tion of the relative magnitudes involved, the aggregate foreign earned income reported by
U.S. individuals filing Form 2555 in 2001, plus trust income earned in 2002, was $27.9 bil-
lion. By contrast, the largest controlled foreign corporations of U.S. corporations reported
$160.1 billion of after-tax foreign earnings and profits in 2002. Jeff Curry & Maureen Kee-
nan Kahr, Individual Foreign-Earned Income and Foreign Tax Credit, 2001, IRS, Stat. In-
come Bull., Spring 2004, at 98; Daniel S. Holik, Foreign Trusts, 2002, IRS, Stat. Income
Bull., Summer 2005, at 134; Mike Masters & Catterson Oh, Controlled Foreign Corpora-
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gime in which a home country taxes foreign income to a regime in
which it does not. In practice, countries typically do not adopt such
extreme policy positions. For example, a country such as France,
which largely exempts foreign business income from taxation, never-
theless taxes small pieces of foreign income;2 and a country such as
the United States, which attempts to tax the foreign incomes of U.S.
corporations, permits taxpayers to defer home country taxation in
some circumstances, claim foreign tax credits in most situations,3 and
in other ways avoid the consequences of full home country taxation.
It is nevertheless useful to consider stylized and somewhat extreme
versions of territoriality and residence taxation, in part because the
older theory that forms the basis of much U.S. policy advocates in
favor of an extreme position of taxing worldwide income, and in part
because insights drawn from considering extreme examples prove use-
ful in understanding the murky middle to which tax policies naturally
tend in practice.
The older wisdom in the international tax policy area holds that
worldwide taxation of business income with provision of foreign tax
credits promotes world welfare, whereas worldwide taxation of busi-
ness income without foreign tax credits (instead permitting taxpayers
to deduct foreign tax payments in calculating taxable income) pro-
motes domestic welfare. These claims about the underlying welfare
economics, introduced by Peggy Musgrave 4 and subsequently quite in-
fluential, have come under considerable academic fire in recent
years. 5 Modern economic thinking parts company with Musgrave's
analysis in two important respects. The first is that modern scholar-
ship incorporates the impact of economic distortions introduced by
taxes other than those imposed on foreign income, which Musgrave's
tions, 2002, IRS, Stat. Income Bull., Spring 2006, at 193. Any unreported income is of
course not captured in these figures.
2 Code G6n6ral des Imp6ts art. 209 (stating that, subject to tax treaties and certain ex-
ceptions, only profits from operations in France are subject to corporate income tax); id.
art. 209B (providing an exception for controlled corporations located in a country with a
preferential tax regime); id. art. 238 bis. 01 (creating an anti-abuse provision for French
corporations that move assets out of France); id. art. 209 quinquies (allowing a French
corporation to be taxed on either consolidated profits or worldwide profits, with consent
from the Ministry of Economy and Finance).
3 IRC §§ 901, 902.
4 Peggy Brewer Richman [Musgrave], Taxation of Foreign Investment Income: An Eco-
nomic Analysis (1963); Peggy B. Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment
Income: Issues and Arguments (1969).
5 See Michael Keen & Hannu Piekkola, Simple Rules for the Optimal Taxation of Inter-
national Capital Income, 99 Scand. J. Econ. 447 (1997); Joel Slemrod, Carl Hansen &
Roger Procter, The Seesaw Principle in International Tax Policy, 65 J. Pub. Econ. 163
(1997); James R. Hines Jr., The Case Against Deferral: A Deferential Reconsideration, 52
Nat'l Tax J. 385 (1999); Michael Keen & David Wildasin, Pareto-Efficient International
Taxation, 94 Am. Econ. Rev. 259 (2004).
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analysis does not. The second is that modern scholarship incorporates
reactions by foreigners to home country tax changes. Capital owner-
ship by foreign and domestic investors is directly affected by home
country tax policies, and these ownership effects, properly under-
stood, have the potential to reverse entirely the welfare prescriptions
that flow from Musgrave's analysis.
The second and third Sections of this Article review the older the-
ory of home country taxation of foreign income, the more modern
ownership neutrality concepts, and their implications. These owner-
ship neutrality concepts, which are developed in Desai and Hines,6
offer normative criteria by which to evaluate the desirability of tax
systems in practice. The ownership neutrality concepts stress the im-
portance of productivity effects of capital ownership in evaluating the
incentives created by tax systems.
Section IV considers the implications of capital ownership for the
design of tax systems that exempt foreign income from taxation. In
particular, this Section notes that in order to create efficient owner-
ship incentives it is necessary to avoid using simple formulas to allo-
cate general domestic expense deductions between domestic and
foreign income.
In an effort to make the ownership issues perhaps more vivid, Sec-
tion V evaluates rather whimsical systems of residence-based excise
and value-added taxation. The same arguments that typically are ad-
vanced in favor of worldwide taxation of corporate income apply with
equal force to residence-based excise and value-added taxation, and
the evident drawbacks of the latter apply equally to residence-based
corporate income taxation.
Section VI considers the implications of residence taxation for tax-
payer equity and the distribution of tax burdens, noting that equitable
taxpayer treatment requires a special regime for the taxation of for-
eign income, and that the burdens (including the efficiency costs) of
taxing foreign income typically are borne by domestic labor in the
form of lower real wages. Section VII considers the implications of
practical complications, including the reactions of foreign govern-
ments and the ability of taxpayers to avoid taxes on domestic income.
Section VIII is the conclusion.
6 See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate
Tax Policy in a Global Setting, 57 Nat'l Tax J. 937 (2004) [hereinafter Old Rules]; Mihir A.
Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 Nat'l Tax J. 487
(2003) [hereinafter Tax Reform].
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II. OLDER ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS 7
Capital export neutrality (CEN) as defined by Musgrave is the cri-
terion that an investor's capital income is taxed at the same total rate
wherever the income is earned. The idea behind CEN is that equal
taxation of income earned in different locations effectively removes
location-based tax incentives, thereby encouraging firms to locate
their investments wherever they generate the greatest pretax returns.
Since in a world without taxation firms likewise face incentives to
maximize pretax returns and market outcomes are generally thought
to be efficient in the absence of taxation, it seems natural to associate
CEN with efficient production incentives.
Implementation of CEN requires governments to adjust their taxa-
tion of investment returns based on the tax policies of other countries.
Since investors always have the option of earning income in their
home countries, CEN is satisfied if foreign income is subject to the
same rate of taxation as is income earned at home. This is far from
guaranteed, since tax rates differ substantially among countries, and
the international convention is that countries in which investments are
located are entitled to tax investment returns at their own tax rates.
Consequently, it falls upon home governments to implement CEN if
they choose to do so, by adjusting their own taxation of foreign in-
come earned by their residents. A home government can support
CEN by subjecting foreign income to taxation at a rate equal to the
difference between the home country tax rate and the foreign tax rate,
thereby producing a total (foreign plus home) tax burden equal to the
home country tax rate. A home country that taxes worldwide income
at the same rate that it taxes domestic income, and permits taxpayers
to claim credits for any income taxes paid to foreign governments,
effectively implements a system that is consistent with CEN. It is
noteworthy that such a system would not permit taxpayers to defer
home country taxation of unrepatriated foreign income, and imposes
no limits on foreign tax credits, so investors subject to foreign tax rates
that exceed the domestic tax rate would receive tax rebates from their
home country.
The United States currently taxes worldwide income and permits
investors to claim foreign tax credits, but U.S. taxation of certain for-
eign income is deferred until the income is repatriated, and foreign tax
credits are limited to prevent high rates of foreign taxation from pro-
ducing U.S. tax rebates. As a result, the current U.S. tax system does
not correspond to a system that implements CEN. Despite this differ-
ence, CEN is often used as a basis with which to analyze potential
7 This Section and the Section that follows draw on Desai & Hines, Old Rules, note 6,
and Desai & Hines, Tax Reform, note 6.
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reforms to the U.S. tax system, 8 since CEN is thought to maximize the
economic welfare of the world as a whole.
Policies that encourage efficient allocation of investment need not
maximize the welfare of home countries, since home countries may
not receive all of the benefits of improved resource allocation. The
Musgrave concept of National Neutrality (NN) is that home countries
promote domestic welfare by taxing worldwide income while treating
foreign income taxes simply as costs of doing business. Consequently,
a home country tax system that satisfies NN is one in which investors
are required to pay home country taxes on their foreign incomes and
are permitted to deduct foreign tax payments from taxable income.
This system does not permit taxpayers to claim foreign tax credits,
since it does not distinguish foreign tax costs from other foreign costs,
such as the costs of labor and materials. The fact that foreign taxes
represent transfers to foreign governments rather than real resource
costs is, by this analysis, irrelevant to the home country.
The analysis of national neutrality suggests that almost all countries
treat foreign income far too generously, since permitting taxpayers to
claim foreign tax credits-or worse, exempting foreign income from
home taxes entirely-encourages excessive investment from the
standpoint of the home country. Since CEN calls for foreign tax
credit systems, it follows from the Musgrave analysis that there is a
tension between policies that maximize national welfare-NN-and
policies that maximize global welfare-CEN-and that some kind of
cooperative agreement might be needed to align national and global
interests. There remains, however, the empirical puzzle of why virtu-
ally every country fails to pursue its own interest by subjecting after-
tax foreign income to full domestic taxation, and in particular why so
many countries exempt foreign income from taxation.
Capital Import Neutrality (CIN) is the concept that an investment
should be taxed at the same total rate regardless of the location of the
investor. Taxation by host countries at rates that differ between loca-
tions can be consistent with CIN, since different investors are taxed
(at the corporate level) at identical rates on the same income. In or-
der for such a system to satisfy CIN, however, it is also necessary that
individual income tax rates be harmonized, since CIN requires that
the combined tax burden on saving and investment in each location
8 See, e.g., Office of Tax Pol'y, Treasury Dep't, The Deferral of Income Earned through
U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations: A Policy Study 53 (2000), available at http://www.
treasury.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/subpartf.pdf; Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 102d
Cong., Factors Affecting the International Competitiveness of the United States 246-48
(Comm. Print 1991); Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Getting
Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. Rev.
455 (1999).
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not differ between investors. While CEN is commonly thought to
characterize tax systems that promote efficient production, 9 CIN is
thought to characterize tax systems that promote efficient saving. An-
other difference is that CIN is a feature of all tax systems analyzed
jointly, whereas individual country policies can embody CEN or NN.
As a practical matter, since many national policies influence the re-
turn to savers, CIN is often dismissed as a policy objective compared
to CEN and NN.
Several important assumptions are buried inside the analytic
frameworks that imply that CEN maximizes global welfare. The first
assumption is that home country governments have incentives to max-
imize the profits of home country firms plus the value of the taxes that
they pay to the home government. The second assumption is that for-
eign tax policies do not respond to home country tax policies. The
third assumption is that host governments value inbound foreign di-
rect investment in a manner that is unrelated to their tax rates. And
the fourth assumption is that home country taxation of foreign income
does not directly or indirectly affect foreign firms.
Policies that promote the efficient operation of domestic firms also
promote domestic welfare when domestic residents have stakes in the
success of home country firms, which they can as shareholders, em-
ployees, customers, those who sell these firms inputs, or who interact
with them in other capacities. The first assumption takes the (tax)
residence of home country firms as fixed, and does not incorporate
the efficiency cost associated with raising government revenue from
virtually any source. The second assumption implies that govern-
ments ignore their impact on each other's policies, and the third as-
sumption requires that governments not adjust tax rates in a way that
reflects the value to their economies of attracting additional invest-
ment. These assumptions have been subjected to critical analysis,10
though there are adherents of CEN who insist that its implications
survive these criticisms."
9 See Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation of International Investment In-
come, 94 Q.J. Econ. 793 (1980) (identifying circumstances in which the optimal taxation of
foreign income corresponds to CEN). For a recent statement of the significance of CEN,
see Donald J. Rousslang, Deferral and the Optimal Taxation of International Investment
Income, 53 Nat'l Tax J. 589 (2000).
10 See, e.g., Roger H. Gordon & James R. Hines Jr., International Taxation, in 4 Hand-
book of Public Economics 1935 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002); Gary
Clyde Hufbauer, U.S. Taxation of International Income: Blueprint for Reform (1992); see
also Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture, NYU School of
Law (Oct. 26, 2000), in 54 Tax L. Rev. 261 (2001); Koichi Hamada, Strategic Aspects of
Taxation on Foreign Investment Income, 80 Q.J. Econ. 361 (1966); Hines, note 5; Keen &
Piekkola, note 5.
1I See, e.g., Rousslang, note 9.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 62:
HeinOnlin   -- 62 Tax L. Rev. 274 2008-2009
2009] RECONSIDERING THE TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME 275
The fourth assumption, that home country taxation does not di-
rectly or indirectly affect foreign firms, is the least consistent with the-
ory and the most important from the standpoint of its policy
implications. 12 In fact, there is every reason to expect the actions of
domestic firms to affect their foreign competitors; and since domestic
firms are influenced by home country taxation, it follows that foreign
firms are indirectly influenced. In a competitive market, greater for-
eign investment by domestic firms is typically associated with greater
domestic investment by foreign firms. The NN implication that home
countries maximize their own welfare by subjecting foreign income to
taxation with only deductions for foreign income tax payments then
no longer follows, since from the standpoint of the home country,
greater foreign investment by domestic firms does not come at the
cost of reduced domestic investment to the degree that foreign invest-
ment in the home country rises as a result. Hence there is not a wel-
fare loss from reducing domestic investment, because total domestic
investment need not fall when domestic firms undertake greater for-
eign investment. From a CEN standpoint, this logic also implies that
worldwide taxation with foreign tax credits need not promote efficient
global production, since the effect of domestic investment abroad on
foreign investment at home means that efficiency is advanced by en-
couraging economically appropriate ownership of assets.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF CAPITAL OWNERSHIP
This section describes the application of ownership criteria to the
taxation of foreign income, and offers an assessment of the impor-
tance of capital ownership to economic welfare.
A. Capital Ownership Neutrality
Capital Ownership Neutrality (CON) is a property of tax systems
that maintain incentives for efficient ownership of capital assets. Cap-
ital ownership neutrality is important to efficiency only insofar as
ownership is important to efficiency, a notion that is ruled out by as-
sumption in the Musgrave framework that serves as the basis of CEN
and NN. If the productivity of a business asset depends in part on
12 Levinsohn and Slemrod and Devereux and Hubbard analyze the behavior of oligo-
polistic firms in world markets, identifying the effects of home country tax rules on the
behavior of foreign firms that compete with home country firms. Michael P. Devereux &
R. Glenn Hubbard, Taxing Multinationals, 10 Int'l Tax & Pub. Fin. 469 (2003); James
Levinsohn & Joel Slemrod, Taxes, Tariffs, and the Global Corporation, 51 J. Pub. Econ. 97
(1993).
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how it is owned and controlled, then an efficient tax system provides
incentives for ownership that maximizes the value of output.
Consider the case in which all countries exempt foreign income
from taxation. Then the tax treatment of foreign investment income is
the same for all investors, and competition between potential buyers
allocates assets to their most productive owners. Allocation on the
basis of productivity typically does not imply that all assets would be
held by a small number of highly efficient owners, since there are lim-
its to the abilities of owners and managers to maintain the productiv-
ity of widespread business operations, and therefore benefits to
specialized ownership. 13 Efficient ownership entails combining assets
in a way that is more productive than alternative ownership arrange-
ments, taking into account the costs of trying to maintain too large or
too diverse a set of assets under single ownership and management.
If the rest of the world exempted foreign income from taxation
while the United States taxed foreign worldwide and granted Ameri-
cans the opportunity to claim foreign tax credits for foreign income
tax payments, then the difference between these tax treatments of for-
eign income would influence ownership patterns. Foreign investors
would have stronger relative incentives to hold assets in low-tax coun-
tries, since they benefit from reduced tax rates whereas Americans,
who also benefit from lower foreign tax rates, simultaneously receive
fewer foreign tax credits for their investments in low-tax locations.
Consequently American investments can be expected to be more
strongly concentrated in high-tax countries than is true of the rest of
the world. As a result, the tax treatment of foreign income distorts
asset ownership, moving it away from the pattern that is associated
with maximum productivity.
In this example, if the United States were to join the rest of the
world in exempting foreign income from taxation then tax systems
would no longer distort asset ownership, thereby satisfying the re-
quirement for CON. Capital ownership neutrality, however, does not
require that every country exempt foreign income from taxation: In-
stead what is required is that foreign income be taxed in a similar
matter by all countries. For example, countries with differing home
tax rates might all tax foreign income while granting taxpayers the
opportunity to claim foreign tax credits, and despite the underlying
differences in tax rates, such a configuration would satisfy CON. The
reason is that investors all face incentives to choose investments that
13 Mitchell Kane considers the tax implications of a different notion of efficient owner-
ship, which accounts for the differences between the implications he draws for efficient
taxation and those of capital ownership neutrality and national ownership neutrality. See
Mitchell A. Kane, Ownership Neutrality, Ownership Distortions, and International Tax
Welfare Benchmarks, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 53 (2006).
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maximize pretax income, and since this is common across countries,
there are no tax-based incentives to reallocate assets among investors
from countries with differing tax systems.
Efficient allocation of capital ownership means that it is impossible
to increase productivity by reallocating assets between owners. This
does not require that assets be equally productive with any owner,14
since what matters is the potential productivity gain to be had by
swapping assets among owners. Thus, investors from Country A
might have stronger tax incentives to invest in low tax countries than
is true for investors from Country B. It follows from the difference
between their tax systems that there are potential productivity gains
to be had by trading some high-tax investments held by Country B
owners for low-tax investments held by Country A owners-and this
potential productivity gain is available despite any underlying differ-
ences in productivity rates associated with ownership. Hence it is dif-
ferences in the relative tax treatment of investments in differing
locations, rather than absolute differences in the productivity of dif-
fering owners, that give rise to asset ownership inefficiencies. Systems
that tax foreign income similarly therefore maintain efficient owner-
ship patterns even if their tax rates differ.
The welfare properties of CON emphasize the allocation of owner-
ship of a given volume of business activity between locations whose
tax attributes differ. The taxation of foreign income also has the po-
tential to influence rates of national saving and the sizes of domestic
firms, though this effect is not explicitly incorporated in the analysis.
National saving is affected by a large range of public policies including
monetary policy, intergenerational redistribution programs such as so-
cial security, the taxation of personal income, estate taxation, and
other policies that influence the discount rates used by savers. Busi-
ness activity is likewise influenced by a host of fiscal, monetary, and
regulatory policies. Given these various factors that influence na-
tional saving and corporate investment, it is appropriate to analyze the
optimal taxation of foreign and domestic income separately from the
question of how much governments should encourage capital accumu-
lation and total investment of home-based firms.
B. National Ownership Neutrality
The importance of ownership to productivity carries the implication
that countries acting on behalf of their own economic interests have
incentives to exempt foreign income from taxation. This perhaps sur-
14 Id. at 27 (arguing that only when capital is equally productive in the hands of each
investor would there be an efficient allocation of capital ownership).
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prising conclusion reflects that, viewed exclusively from an ownership
standpoint, additional foreign investment does not come at the cost of
reduced domestic investment, since additional foreign investment re-
flects a reallocation of ownership rights in which domestic owners ob-
tain foreign assets by swapping domestic assets to foreign owners. As
a result, there is no associated reduction in real domestic investment
levels, and the effect of foreign investment on domestic tax revenue
depends entirely on the productivity of the resulting ownership pat-
tern. To a first approximation there is little effect of additional foreign
investment on domestic tax revenue, which is very different from the
premise of the Musgrave analysis in which foreign investment comes
dollar for dollar at the expense of domestic investment. Countries
therefore maximize their welfare by maximizing the productivity of
their domestic and foreign assets, which they do by exempting foreign
profits from home country taxation. It does not follow that such a
policy encourages excessive foreign investment, since the cost of for-
eign investment is the cost of trading domestic assets for foreign as-
sets, and domestic taxes are built into this cost, since any new owners
of domestic assets will have to pay those taxes. Given this implicit
cost, a policy of exempting foreign income from taxation effectively
subjects all investments to the same tax rate, and thereby promotes
efficiency.
Tax systems that promote domestic welfare by exempting foreign
income from taxation can be said to satisfy National Ownership Neu-
trality (NON). It is noteworthy that countries have incentives based
on ownership considerations to exempt foreign income from taxation
no matter what policies other countries pursue. It is therefore per-
haps understandable why so many countries have persisted in exempt-
ing foreign income from taxation, since such policies advance their
interests-and if every country exempted foreign income from taxa-
tion, the uniformity of tax treatment would promote an efficient allo-
cation of capital ownership that maximizes world productivity. To be
sure, there are important considerations omitted from this analysis,
including the requirement that taxpayers adhere to rules concerning
the allocation of income for tax purposes. One concern often ex-
pressed about exempting foreign income from taxation is that doing
so might encourage taxpayers to report that income actually earned at
home was instead earned in low-tax foreign locations. While taxpay-
ers may face such incentives under a system of worldwide taxation
with foreign tax credits, presumably the incentives would be stronger
if foreign income were entirely exempt from domestic taxation. 15 This
15 See, e.g., Michael J. McIntyre, Guidelines for Taxing International Capital Flows:
The Legal Perspective, 46 Nat'l Tax J. 315 (1993). There is ample evidence, reported in
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problem, to the extent that it is one, is best addressed directly with
enforcement of existing and potentially new rules rather than by mod-
ifying the taxation of foreign income to accommodate income shifting
behavior on the part of taxpayers.
C. Implications of Ownership
The principles of CON and NON are based on the welfare impact
of the importance of ownership to productivity in the design of inter-
national tax systems. This emphasis on ownership effects is consistent
with the modern theory of foreign direct investment, which is based
on a transaction-cost approach under which the market advantages of
multinational firms arise from the benefits of joint ownership of assets
across locations. It is also consistent with the scale of operation of the
large and very active worldwide market in mergers, acquisitions, and
asset divestitures. Participating firms presumably are willing to as-
sume the costs of ownership realignments because of their
advantages.
16
Desai and Hines review the extensive available evidence of the im-
pact of home country tax regimes on patterns of asset ownership by
multinational firms,17 including the effects of foreign tax systems on
the location of investment within the United States, 18 the effects of
home country taxes on the distribution of American and Japanese in-
vestment around the world, 19 and the impact of foreign tax credit and
deferral rules on asset ownership.20 The ownership structure of out-
bound foreign investment likewise appears to be sensitive to its tax
consequences. 21 And Desai and Hines analyze dramatic ownership
James R. Hines, Jr., Lessons from Behavioral Responses to International Taxation, 52
Nat'l Tax J. 305 (1999), that tax rates influence the location of reported pretax income.
16 Johannes Becker and Clemens Fuest analyze the effects of tax systems on incentives
to undertake international mergers and acquisitions, concluding that international con-
formity, and in particular territorial taxation, promotes efficient merger activity. See Jo-
hannes Becker & Clemens Fuest, Corporate Tax Policy and International Mergers and
Acquisitions: Is the Tax Exemption System Superior? (Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst.
for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1884, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=959991.
17 Desai & Hines, Tax Reform, note 6.
18 See James R. Hines, Jr., Altered States: Taxes and the Location of Foreign Direct
Investment in America, 86 Am. Econ. Rev. 1076 (1996).
19 James R. Hines Jr., Tax Sparing and Direct Investment in Developing Countries, in
International Taxation and Multinational Activity 39 (James R. Hines Jr. ed., 2001).
20 Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., "Basket Cases": Tax Incentives and Interna-
tional Joint Venture Participation by American Multinational Firms, 71 J. Pub. Econ. 379
(1999); see also Rosanne Altshuler & R. Glenn Hubbard, The Effect of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 on the Location of Assets in Financial Services Firms, 87 J. Pub. Econ. 109
(2003).
21 Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Repatriation Taxes, Repatriation Strategies and
Multinational Financial Policy, 87 J. Pub. Econ. 73 (2003); Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley &
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reversals in which U.S. multinational firms expatriate by inverting
their corporate structure, reconfiguring their ownership as foreign cor-
porations in order to reduce the burden imposed by U.S. tax rules.22
These and other cases indicate that ownership patterns of foreign affil-
iates and their parent companies are significantly affected by tax in-
centives in their home countries.
D. Foreign Investment and Domestic Investment
One of the significant ways in which the modern analysis of taxing
foreign income parts company with earlier approaches lies in its con-
sideration of the impact of outbound investment on domestic invest-
ment. As noted above, once one acknowledges that greater foreign
investment need not entail reduced domestic investment, then the op-
portunity cost of greater foreign investment changes significantly, and
with it, the desirability of taxing foreign income.
International capital market equilibrium implies that the capital ac-
count must be balanced over time: Net outbound foreign investment
equals net inbound foreign investment in present value. It does not
follow, however, from this implication of market equilibrium that
greater outbound foreign direct investment triggers greater inbound
foreign direct investment, since the capital account can be balanced
either through foreign direct investment flows or through portfolio
capital flows. 23 Hence the degree to which greater outbound foreign
direct investment is associated with greater or lesser domestic invest-
ment is ultimately an empirical question.
There is a flurry of recent evidence suggesting that greater out-
bound foreign direct investment may not reduce the size of the do-
mestic capital stock, but instead more likely increases it. This
evidence includes aggregate time series evidence of the behavior of
U.S. multinational firms,24 aggregate evidence for Australia, industry-
level studies of Germany25 and Canada,26 and firm-level evidence for
James R. Hines Jr., Chains of Ownership, Regional Tax Competition, and Foreign Direct
Investment, in Foreign Direct Investment in the Real and Financial Sector of Industrial
Countries 61 (Heinz Herrmann & Robert Lipsey eds., 2003).
22 Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing the
Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 Nat'l Tax J. 409 (2002).
23 Official transfers also enter the capital account, although these are typically of very
small net magnitude.
24 See Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines Jr., Foreign Direct Investment
and the Domestic Capital Stock, Am. Econ. Rev., May 2005, at 33, 33.
25 See Christian Arndt, Claudia M. Buch & Monika Schnitzer, FDI and Domestic In-
vestment: An Industry-Level View 27 (Governance & the Efficiency of Econ. Sys., Work-
ing Paper No. 212, 2007), available at http://www.sfbtrl5.de/dipa/212.pdf.
26 See Walid Hejazi & P. Pauly, Motivations for FDI and Domestic Capital Formation,
34 J. Int'l Bus. Stud. 282, 282-83, 286 (2003) (demonstrating that outbound foreign direct
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the United States, 27 the United Kingdom, 28 and Germany.29 The diffi-
culty confronting all of these studies is that foreign investment is itself
a purposive choice, reflecting economic conditions that very likely
also directly influence the desirability of domestic investment, making
it difficult to disentangle the pure effect of greater foreign investment
on domestic economic activity. These studies approach this problem
in different ways, drawing conclusions that are accordingly persuasive
to differing degrees, although the accumulation of this evidence
strongly points to the possibility that greater outbound investment
need not be associated with reduced domestic investment.
The study by Desai, Foley, and Hines is instructive in this regard, as
it exploits firm-level information and differences in foreign economic
growth rates to identify the effects of greater outbound foreign invest-
ment.30 U.S. firms investing in foreign countries whose economies
grow rapidly tend to exhibit much faster growth rates of foreign direct
investment than do otherwise similar U.S. firms investing in foreign
countries that experience slow economic growth.31 Hence it is possi-
ble to use (firm-specific) average foreign economic growth rates to
predict changes in foreign investment, which in turn can be compared
to subsequent changes in domestic economic activity. The evidence
indicates that, for U.S. firms, 10% greater foreign capital investment is
associated with 2.6% greater domestic investment, and 10% greater
foreign employment is associated with 3.7% greater domestic employ-
ment.32 Foreign investment also has positive estimated effects on do-
mestic exports and research and development spending, suggesting
that growth-driven foreign expansions stimulate demand for tangible
and intangible domestic output.
E. Is Ownership Decisive?
The analysis of ownership incentives carries implications for tax
policy that differ sharply from those of allocating a fixed supply of
investment increases domestic capital stock when directed toward some countries and de-
creases it when directed toward others).
27 See Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines Jr., Domestic Effects of the
Foreign Activities of U.S. Multinationals, 1 Am. Econ. J.: Econ. Pol'y 181, 201 (2009).
28 See Helen Simpson, How Does Overseas Investment Affect Activity at Home? 29-30
(Apr. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.ifs.org.uk/docs/etpf/simpson.
pdf).
29 See Jorn Kleinert & Farid Toubal, The Impact of Locating Production Abroad on
Activities at Home: Evidence from German Firm-Level Data 23 (Eberhard-Karls Univ.
Tubingen, Discussion Paper No. 314, 2007), available at http://tobias-lib.ub.uni-tuebingen.
de/volltexte/2007/3081/pdf/314.pdf.
30 See Desai et al., note 27, at 182.
31 Id. at 192.
32 Id. at 182.
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capital between competing locations. In the standard Musgrave set-
ting, the problem is that tax rates differ between countries. This then
leads to excessive investment in low-tax countries, 33 and by compari-
son inadequate investment in high-tax countries. 34 The solution of-
fered by the CEN paradigm is to undo international tax rate
differences with offsetting differences in home country taxation.
The ownership approach identifies a different set of problems and a
different tax policy to address these problems. Distortions to interna-
tional ownership create their own inefficiencies and thereby threaten
productivity in a manner no less real, and certainly no less important,
than the inefficiencies that may arise from too many factories appear-
ing in tax havens. A tax system that seeks to implement CEN to cor-
rect the problem of investment incentives thereby creates its own set
of problems with distorted ownership, and the evidence, both casual
and statistical, is that ownership is highly sensitive to its tax treatment.
These issues would be moot if all countries were to discontinue tax-
ing business income at source, but whatever may be the potential effi-
ciency gains of such a reform, governments are unlikely to undertake
it in the near future. Hence the more restricted efficiency question
concerns the appropriate taxation of foreign business income in a
world with many tax rate differences, with activities within a country
taxed at many different rates, and therefore many sources of potential
inefficiency. In emphasizing ownership rather than other dimensions
of business activity, the analysis takes these ownership and control
considerations to be of first order importance.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR EXPENSE ALLOCATION
Businesses engaging in worldwide production typically incur signifi-
cant costs that are difficult to attribute directly to income produced in
certain locations. Important examples of such expenses include those
for interest payments and general administrative overhead. There is a
very important question of how these expenses should be treated for
tax purposes. Practices differ in countries around the world, and in-
deed, U.S. practice has varied over time, but the current U.S. tax
treatment is squarely on the side of allocating domestic expenses be-
tween foreign and domestic income based on simple indicators of eco-
nomic activity.35 Thus, for example, a U.S. multinational firm with
33 As Hines and others note, the welfare cost of excessive investment in low-tax coun-
tries takes country tax rates to be unrelated to the social value of FDI. See Hines, note 5,
at 398.
34 Id.
35 Reg. §§ 1.861-8, 1.861-8T, 1.861-9, 1.861-9T, 1.861-10, 1.861-10T (apportioning in-
come, interest expense, and other expenses through a formulary approach).
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$100 of domestic interest expense is not permitted to claim as many
foreign tax credits as is an otherwise equivalent U.S. firm without the
interest expense, reflecting the theory that a portion of the borrowing
on which interest is due went to finance foreign investment.
Expense allocation of the variety embodied in current U.S. tax law
has a decided intuitive appeal. It carries the general implication that
domestic expenses that are incurred in the production of foreign in-
come that is exempt from U.S. taxation (as is the case, for example, of
income earned in countries with very high tax rates, for which foreign
tax credits are available) are effectively not permitted domestic tax
deductions (via an equivalent reduction in foreign tax credit limits).
While one can, and undoubtedly should, criticize the details of the
current U.S. rules governing expense allocation, it must be conceded
that the general structure of expense allocation is largely consistent
with the rest of the U.S. system of attempting to tax foreign income in
a manner that vaguely embodies CEN.36
Taking as a premise that CEN is an unsatisfactory basis for taxing
foreign income, and that a country prefers to exempt foreign income
from taxation based on capital ownership considerations, then what
kind of expense allocation regime properly accompanies the exemp-
tion of foreign source dividends from domestic taxation? The answer
is that domestic expenses must not be allocated at all, but instead
traced to their uses, as most countries other than the United States
currently do with respect to interest expense. To put the same matter
differently, tax systems should permit taxpayers to allocate general ex-
penses that cannot be directly attributed to identifiable uses in such a
way that they are fully deductible in the country in which they are
incurred.
In order to understand the logic behind permitting the full deduct-
ibility of domestic expenses, it is helpful to start by noting that any
other system of expense allocation will have the effect of distorting
ownership by changing the cost of foreign investment. Consider the
case of a firm with both foreign and domestic income, and $150 of
expenses incurred domestically in the course of activities that help the
firm generally, and thereby arguably contribute both to domestic and
foreign income production. One sensible-looking rule would be to al-
locate the $150 of expenses according to income production, so that if
the firm earns half of its income abroad and half at home, with the
foreign half exempt from domestic taxation, then the firm would be
36 Daniel Shaviro criticizes U.S. interest expense rules, and observes that, given the
problems of worldwide allocation, even a country committed to CEN might want to con-
sider tracing interest expenses rather than using a formula to allocate interest. Daniel N.
Shaviro, Does More Sophisticated Mean Better? A Critique of Alternative Approaches to
Sourcing the Interest Expense of U.S. Multinationals, 54 Tax L. Rev. 353, 356-57 (2001).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law ReviewHeinOnlin   -- 62 Tax L. Rev. 283 2008-2009
TAX LAW REVIEW
entitled to deduct only $75 of its expenses against its domestic taxable
income.37 For a firm with a given level of borrowing, greater foreign
investment would then be associated with reduced domestic interest
deductions, and therefore greater domestic taxes. Hence the home
country in fact would impose a tax on foreign income, in the sense of
discouraging foreign investment and triggering additional domestic
tax collections for every additional dollar of foreign investment. The
only sense in which this tax differs from a more conventional tax on
foreign income is that it does not vary with the rate of foreign
profitability.
The fact that a simple-minded expense allocation rule acts just like a
tax on foreign investment might at first suggest that those who design
policy should seek alternative expense allocation systems that do not
create these incentives. Unfortunately, there is no clever solution
available for this problem: Any system that allocates expenses based
on a taxpayer's behavior will have the effect of influencing that behav-
ior, in the same way that a more conventional tax would. An alterna-
tive system of tracing expenses, in which taxpayers determine and
report the uses to which deductible expenses are put, does not have
this feature but creates ample opportunities for tax avoidance.
38
Hence policies designed to avoid taxing foreign income necessarily
must forgo allocating expenses incurred domestically.
This implication of foreign income exemption seems to run afoul of
obvious objections from the standpoint of tax arbitrage. Why should
the United States permit taxpayers to borrow in the United States,
using the proceeds to invest abroad, and thereby earn income that is
exempt from U.S. tax while claiming deductions against other U.S.
taxable income for the cost of their borrowing? Even the observation
that this is exactly what many other countries do has the feel of not
fully addressing this issue. The answer lies in the fact that greater for-
eign investment triggers added domestic investment, 39 so from the
37 We could envision a world in which foreign governments might permit the firm to
deduct the other $75 of its expenses against income earned in their country, though this is
of course not the world we inhabit. The discussion that follows assumes that governments
do not permit deductions for general expenses incurred in other countries, as is indeed the
universal practice.
38 See Shaviro, note 36, at 354.
39 See notes 24-30 and accompanying text. It is worth emphasizing that a system of
CON and NON would subject truly passive foreign income to domestic taxation. See
Desai & Hines, Old Rules, note 6, at 950 & n.22. One can think of a parent company using
the proceeds from issuing a bond to invest in a foreign affiliate that uses its invested capital
to buy the bond. In such a case, either the home country should subject the foreign income
to taxation and permit a deduction for domestic interest expenses, or else exempt the for-
eign interest income from taxation and deny the domestic interest expense deduction. The
argument in this Section presumes that the passive foreign interest income would be taxed
by the home government.
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standpoint of the U.S. tax system, the borrowing does not simply gen-
erate uncompensated interest deductions, but instead a domestic tax
base that is equivalent to (quite possibly greater than) the tax base
that would be forthcoming if the borrowing proceeds were invested
domestically by the same entity that does the borrowing.
The same point can be considered from the standpoint of the tax-
payer. A U.S. multinational firm with domestic and foreign opera-
tions should be indifferent, at the margin, between investing an
additional dollar at home or abroad; if not, the firm is not maximizing
profits. Hence when the firm borrows an additional dollar to invest
abroad, it might as well invest at home, since the two produce
equivalent after-tax returns-and it is clear that if a purely domestic
firm borrows to undertake a domestic investment, it is entitled to de-
ductions for its interest expenses.
Part of the confusion that surrounds the treatment of interest ex-
penses (and other general expenses that firms incur and that are diffi-
cult to assign to particular lines of business) is that, from a tax
standpoint, the marginal source of investment finance matters greatly.
That said, the marginal source of investment finance is extremely diffi-
cult to pinpoint. Debt finance is generally preferred to equity finance
on the basis of tax considerations, since in a classical corporate income
tax system such as that practiced by the United States, interest ex-
penses are deductible whereas dividend payments to shareholders are
not. Hence debt finance might be thought of as a worst case scenario
from the standpoint of raising corporate tax revenue; with appropriate
income measurement, marginal debt-financed domestic investments
generate no tax revenue, and with inappropriate income measure-
ment, these investments might generate positive or negative tax
revenue.
If the goal of a tax system is properly to raise revenue while offering
appropriate economic incentives, and these are understood to include
efficient incentives for capital ownership, then the simple exemption
of foreign income from taxation is insufficient without accompanying
expense allocation rules. Exempting foreign income from taxation
gives taxpayers incentives to allocate their resources to maximize af-
ter-local-tax profits only if there is no unwinding of these incentives
through expense allocation that depends on where income is earned
or where other expenses are incurred. Using a system of expense trac-
ing that in practice often entails full deductibility of domestic expenses
need not be viewed as a daring step. The same logic that underlies the
efficiency rationale behind exempting foreign income in the first place
also implies that expenses should be deductible where incurred.
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V. RESIDENCE-BASED EXCISE AND VALUE-ADDED TAXATION
The current U.S. system of taxing foreign income includes the pro-
viso that taxpayers are entitled to claim foreign tax credits only for
foreign income taxes, and related taxes, paid (or deemed paid) to for-
eign governments.40 Consequently, the payment of other taxes, such
as foreign excise taxes, value-added taxes, property taxes, and many
others, does not create an entitlement to claim foreign tax credits.
41
In practice, this restriction creates numerous difficulties both for tax-
payers, who may be denied U.S. foreign tax credits for payments to
foreign governments that bear many similarities to income taxes, and
for foreign governments, who are often eager to adopt innovative tax
systems but are deterred by the potential noncreditability of the re-
sulting taxes. The rule limiting foreign tax credits to income taxes is
quantitatively quite important, as the annual foreign income tax pay-
ments of U.S. companies greatly exceed their payment of foreign
taxes that do not qualify as income taxes.
42
Why are foreign tax credits permitted only for foreign income tax
payments? Various justifications have been offered for this restric-
tion, including, prominently, the argument that the burdens of corpo-
rate income taxes fall on owners of capital in the form of lower
returns, whereas the burdens of other taxes tend to fall on foreign
consumers. 43 It is difficult to understand the relevance of tax inci-
dence in this context. In part, this is due to the fact that little was
known until relatively recently about the incidence of corporate in-
come taxes, so any legislative restriction based on knowledge of the
underlying economics of corporate tax incidence prior to the modern
era would have represented a pure stab in the intellectual dark. But
more importantly, it is difficult to discern what possible difference
even secure knowledge of the incidence of corporate taxation would
make to the desirability of permitting taxpayers to claim credits for
alternative taxes paid to foreign governments. The justification for
taxing foreign income after foreign tax credits presumably lies in some
combination of the efficiency and distributional effects of such taxa-
tion from the standpoint of home country taxpayers, to which the ulti-
mate incidence of foreign corporate taxation makes little if any
contribution.
40 IRC §§ 901, 902.
41 IRC §§ 901(b), 902(c)(4)(A); see also Reg. § 1.901-2.
42 See Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines Jr., Foreign Direct Investment in
a World of Multiple Taxes, 88 J. Pub. Econ. 2727 (2004).
43 See Karen Nelson Moore, The Foreign Tax Credit for Foreign Taxes Paid in Lieu of
Income Taxes: An Evaluation of the Rationale and a Reform Proposal, 7 Am. J. Tax Pol'y
207, 219-24 (1988) (discussing and criticizing the incidence justification).
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A simpler and more direct explanation for the practice of limiting
foreign tax credits to foreign income tax payments is the similarity of
the taxes involved, since foreign tax credits are used to offset home
country taxes that otherwise would be due on foreign income. This
logic implies that governments might permit taxpayers to claim credits
for foreign excise tax payments that can be used to offset domestic
excise tax liabilities due on foreign sales, an entitlement that makes
sense only if countries impose worldwide excise taxes on a residence
basis. Such a worldwide excise tax regime offers few attractions from
the standpoint of national economic policy, but analyzing the proper-
ties of such a system offers the prospect of casting useful light on the
taxation of worldwide income on a residence basis.
A. Residence-Based Excise Taxation
To take a concrete example of excise taxation imposed on a resi-
dence basis, suppose that the U.S. federal government were to levy a
$2 tax on each gallon of gasoline sold in the United States and sold
abroad by persons resident in the United States. U.S. taxpayers
would be entitled to claim foreign tax credits for excise taxes paid to
foreign governments, so that a firm selling gasoline in a country whose
excise tax rate exceeds $2 per gallon would owe no additional tax to
the United States, whereas a firm selling gasoline in a country with a
$0.75 per gallon tax would owe $1.25 per gallon to the United States.
One could imagine permitting worldwide averaging, thereby permit-
ting taxpayers to use excess excise tax credits from sales in jurisdic-
tions with excise taxes exceeding $2 per gallon to claim credits to
offset taxes due on sales in jurisdictions with excise taxes less than $2
per gallon.
What would be the impact of such a home country tax regime?
Firms selling in countries with excise taxes exceeding the U.S. rate
would have excess foreign tax credits and therefore no U.S. tax obliga-
tions, so the tax regime would not affect them. Firms without excess
foreign tax credits would face U.S. excise taxes on foreign sales that
vary with local excise tax rates. Odd though such a system would be,
it does not necessarily follow that it would spell the end of foreign
gasoline sales by U.S. companies in all low-tax jurisdictions, though
that is certainly one possibility. U.S. companies would persist in sell-
ing gasoline in those foreign markets in which two conditions hold:
(1) that U.S. firms are profitable, and (2) that the same U.S. firms
could not be even more profitable (in a present value sense) by selling
their operations to foreign petroleum companies who are not subject
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to the U.S. tax regime.44 Since U.S. firms may have significant cost or
marketing advantages over their competition in certain foreign loca-
tions, it is possible that they would be able to remain in business de-
spite the significant tax penalty associated with U.S. residence. In
cases without such advantages, and where low foreign excise tax rates
imply significant U.S. tax costs, U.S. firms are likely to disappear.
The economic costs of a residence-based excise tax regime are sim-
ple to identify. U.S. firms lose the opportunity to earn profits in for-
eign markets from which they are driven by U.S. excise taxes, and this,
in turn, reduces the rate of return to domestic activities that make
foreign operations otherwise profitable. Since there is every reason to
believe that a worldwide excise tax regime would have very significant
effects on the participation of U.S. firms in foreign markets, the asso-
ciated economic costs are potentially enormous. The tax crediting
mechanism creates an odd pattern of U.S. excise taxes on foreign op-
erations, with zero and even (in some cases) negative excise taxes on
foreign sales in some countries, whereas in other countries the U.S.
system imposes positive tax rates that vary with local excises. Even in
circumstances in which U.S. firms sell in foreign markets despite the
imposition of significant U.S. excise taxes on such sales, the volume of
foreign activity will be reduced, and distorted among countries, as a
result of such taxes.
45
What possible justification could be offered for a home country ex-
cise tax regime such as that just described? Many, if not all, of the
same arguments commonly advanced in favor of worldwide income
taxation would apply with equal force to worldwide excise taxation.
From the standpoint of the world as a whole, the benefits of selling an
additional gallon of gasoline in country A equals the benefit to con-
sumers in country A, which in turn is measured by the (tax-inclusive)
price that consumers pay for the gasoline.46 Since sellers receive only
the tax-exclusive price of gasoline, their incentives do not correspond
44 One method of selling foreign operations to foreign companies not subject to the U.S.
tax regime is for a U.S. company to expatriate by inverting the corporate structure to es-
tablish non-U.S. ownership of its foreign operations. The adoption of residence-based ex-
cise taxation would certainly increase incentives to expatriate, and there is ample evidence
that expatriation behavior is sensitive to incentives. See, e.g., Desai & Hines, note 22. The
discussion that follows limits its analysis to situations in which domestic firms face suffi-
cient economic or political costs of expatriating that they do not avail themselves of this
option.
45 Desai et al., note 42, offers evidence of the impact of taxes other than income taxes on
the volume of foreign activity by U.S. businesses.
46 This discussion of the example of gasoline excise taxes puts aside one of the primary
considerations in taxing gasoline, namely the externalities associated with the environmen-
tal, health, congestion, and other consequences of consuming gasoline. To the degree that
countries differ in their gasoline excise taxes based on differences in levels of local exter-
nalities, then global efficiency requires preserving these differences, and not offsetting
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to global efficiency except in the unlikely event that excise taxes are
the same everywhere. In the absence of residence-based worldwide
excise taxation, too few gallons of gasoline will be consumed in coun-
tries with high excise tax rates, and (relatively) too many in countries
with low excise tax rates. Domestic excise taxation might be said to
encourage U.S. firms to move their sales offshore. A system of resi-
dence-based taxation in effect harmonizes excise taxes around the
world from the standpoint of domestic producers.
An analogous argument would apply to domestic welfare, which, by
the standard logic, is maximized by a worldwide excise tax regime
even less generous than that under consideration. Domestic welfare,
the thinking would go, is maximized by subjecting foreign sales to do-
mestic excise taxation without provision of foreign tax credits. The
reason is that, from the standpoint of the United States, the value of
selling a marginal gallon of gasoline in a foreign market equals the
profit that it generates, whereas the value of selling a marginal gallon
of gasoline in the United States equals the profit it generates plus the
associated excise tax revenue. Equating these two requires that the
United States impose equal excise taxes on foreign and domestic sales.
One simple and entirely reasonable objection to subjecting foreign
sales to home country excise taxation is that excise taxes tend to be
incorporated in sales prices, so that, for example, increasing a (com-
monly used today, destination-based) excise tax on gasoline by $0.10
per gallon tends to be associated with roughly $0.10 per gallon higher
gasoline prices. Of course, this incidence is unlikely to be exact, and
indeed, both theoretical and empirical studies of sales tax incidence
find that prices can move by less than, or in some cases more than,
changes in excise tax rates.47 But the efficiency argument-which is
identical to the argument used by Musgrave and many subsequent au-
thors to support worldwide taxation-is valid on its own terms regard-
less of the incidence of the tax. That is, the argument is unchanged
whether or not gasoline taxes are incorporated fully in consumer
prices. Furthermore, and this is the underlying point, the same argu-
ment that consumer prices incorporate excise taxes applies to corpo-
rate income taxes, and for the same reason: Both excise taxes and
corporate income taxes increase the cost of doing business, and mar-
ket forces translate higher costs into higher consumer prices.
them with a residence-based system. But of course the same point applies to income taxes,
as noted above and in Hines, note 5, at 398.
47 See, e.g., Timothy J. Besley & Harvey S. Rosen, Sales Taxes and Prices: An Empirical
Analysis, 52 Nat'l Tax J. 157 (1999); James M. Poterba, Retail Price Reactions to Changes
in State and Local Sales Taxes, 49 Nat'l Tax J. 165 (1996).
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B. Residence-Based Value-Added Taxation
The analysis of the efficiency properties of worldwide taxation, and
the resulting apparent desirability of residence-based excise taxes, ap-
plies with equal force to other taxes, such as value-added taxes. Sup-
pose, for example, that the United Kingdom were to tax value added
on a residence basis, so the 17.5% British value-added tax (VAT) rate
would apply not only to goods and services sold in the United King-
dom (as it does currently), but also to goods and services produced by
U.K. resident firms sold for consumption abroad. Again, one can en-
tertain the possibility of a crediting scheme, in which taxpayers would
be entitled to credit VATs paid to foreign governments against their
domestic tax liabilities. As of 2008 VATs were used by more than 140
countries in the world, though not one of them attempts to levy a VAT
in this way.4s It is instructive to consider the implications of such a
VAT, which offers a clue to why such a design is so unpopular.
The application of such a VAT scheme by the United Kingdom
would obviously stimulate an enormous restructuring of British for-
eign investment. By far the largest destination country for British for-
eign direct investment is the United States, and the absence of a U.S.
VAT implies that the value added produced by the U.S. investment of
British firms would be subject to a 17.5% VAT rate for any firms that
do not have excess VAT credits from other foreign operations. The
British VAT scheme would have less purchase in Europe, given the
generally high VAT rates in the European Union, and indeed, the
availability of excess VAT credits from European operations might
offset a significant portion of U.K. VAT liabilities on U.S. source in-
come for some British taxpayers. But in the circumstances in which
worldwide taxation matters-when taxpayers would not have excess
foreign tax credits in the absence of active management-the resi-
dence-based VAT system would impose significant burdens, and bur-
dens that vary with local VAT rates.
How are taxpayers likely to respond to the introduction of resi-
dence-based value-added taxation? The obvious reaction is to shed,
or avoid in the first place, ownership of value-added producing activi-
ties in jurisdictions where British ownership triggers significant tax lia-
bilities. Again, it does not follow that British firms would maintain no
U.S. operations; it is almost certain that they would continue at least
some operations, despite the tax cost. But the distortion to owner-
ship, investment, and productivity would be enormous.
The older efficiency norms that underlie CEN and related concepts
would evaluate residence-based value-added taxation favorably. Poli-
48 OECD, Consumption Tax Trends 2008: VAT/GST and Excise Rates, Trends and Ad-
ministrative Issues 118-19 (2008) (listing the 143 countries using a VAT).
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cies that allocate value added around the world based on pretax re-
turns maximize world welfare, so the CEN logic implies that total
(host country plus home country) value-added tax rates should be the
same everywhere. In the absence of worldwide tax harmonization,
this can be achieved only by home country tax regimes that offset any
differences between domestic and foreign taxation, as in the hypothet-
ical British example. Home country welfare would be maximized by a
different regime, in which after-foreign-tax returns are subject to
home country value-added taxation at the normal rate. In the British
example, a firm producing $100 of value added in a country with a
20% VAT would pay a VAT of $20 to the foreign government and
then $14 (17.5% * $80) to the U.K. government. This tax system, says
the theory, maximizes home country welfare.
C. Application to Income Taxes
No country attempts to tax sales or value-added on a residence ba-
sis, doubtless deterred by some of the considerations that are apparent
from the preceding analysis. A very similar analysis can be offered for
application of the residence principle to worldwide property and other
taxation. The reason to analyze these taxes is not because they might
realistically be adopted by the United States or some other govern-
ment in the near future, or because they contain desirable features,
but instead for the light that they shed on residence-based systems of
taxing corporate income earned in other countries. To put the matter
directly: Why is it that residence-based excise, value-added, and prop-
erty taxation are clearly undesirable policies, while residence-based
income taxation has not enjoyed the same unpopularity?
Residence-based taxation of foreign income has the same owner-
ship effects as would residence-based excise or value-added taxation,
with the same (negative) impact on economic welfare. The economic
consequences of income taxation seem subtler than those of, say, ex-
cise taxation, but this is merely an illusion, since a $10 million tax lia-
bility associated with U.S. ownership will discourage U.S. ownership
of foreign business assets to the same extent whether the $10 million is
called an income tax or an excise tax.
VI. FAIRNESS AND DISTRIBUTION
This Part considers some of the fairness and income distribution
considerations raised by the question of whether or not to tax foreign
income.
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A. Fairness
Simple fairness principles can have considerable purchase in tax de-
sign, and one of the powerful arguments occasionally advanced in
favor of taxing worldwide income is that the failure to do so would
produce a system that unfairly burdens taxpayers with domestic in-
come relative to taxpayers with foreign income.49 Even in the absence
of widely agreed-upon norms of fairness, this argument has considera-
ble intuitive appeal, and therefore warrants careful consideration.
It is helpful to work through a simple, and somewhat extreme, ex-
ample in order to identify the salient fairness issues at stake in taxing
(or exempting) foreign income. Compare two taxpayers, both earning
$100 of pretax income; one earns $100 domestically, where the income
is subject to a 35% tax, whereas the other earns $100 in a jurisdiction
that does not tax corporate income at all. For simplicity, there are no
other taxes in these countries.
In the absence of worldwide residence-based taxation, it appears
that the taxpayer with foreign income somehow obtains an unfair ad-
vantage over the taxpayer earning domestic income. Both have (by
assumption) equivalent if not identical business operations; both ben-
efit from the services that the home government provides; but only
the taxpayer whose income has a domestic source contributes re-
sources to the provision of home country government services. In
such a setting, and with such reasoning, even the acknowledged equal
opportunity of any taxpayer to earn foreign income if desired hardly
seems to allay fairness concerns.
On closer examination, however, the pretax situations of those
earning foreign and domestic income betray marked dissimilarities.
In the example, the taxpayer with foreign business income operates in
an environment in which it is necessary to compete with other busi-
ness interests that are not subject to the same home country tax re-
gime. Consider the case in which competing business interests are not
subject to taxes beyond the local source-basis tax, either because their
business homes are countries that exempt foreign income from taxa-
tion, or because they are domestic firms in the foreign country. The
profits of these competing firms are therefore not taxed at all, and
competition among these firms therefore drives returns down to a
level at which the pretax rate of return just equals the after-tax returns
49 See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in
International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 Fla. Tax
Rev. 299, 342-43 (2001). But see Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of Interna-
tional Income, 29 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 145, 203 (1998) (criticizing the justification that
fairness principles mandate that international income be subject to home country
taxation).
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available elsewhere. Put simply, the zero tax rate in the foreign juris-
diction unleashes foreign competition that reduces the returns that in-
vestors can earn locally.
To the extent that investors are affected by local foreign competi-
tion, they incur costs that are associated with the competition trig-
gered by low foreign tax rates. For example, foreign investment
attracted by low foreign tax rates will tend to bid up real local wages,
increasing the cost of business for all investors. As a consequence, it is
more difficult than it would be otherwise for a firm to turn a profit in
such a country; to put the same matter differently, an investor in a
zero-tax country pays an implicit tax in the form of lower returns pro-
duced by market competition.
The tax treatment of interest earned on state and local debt offers
an instructive comparison. For most taxpayers, the exemption of state
and local bond interest from taxable income offers a marked benefit,
since, minor complications aside, the after-tax rate of interest equals
the pretax rate of interest. Does it follow that anyone who invests in
state and local bonds receives a significant windfall as a result? Cer-
tainly not, since the availability of the tax exemption greatly increases
demand for these bonds, increasing bond prices and thereby depress-
ing market yields. With a sufficient number of top-bracket investors,
market equilibrium requires that the risk-adjusted after-tax return
available from investing in state and local bonds equals the risk-ad-
justed after-tax return available from other securities held by top-
bracket investors.50 Thus the tax exemption for state and local bond
interest fails to ignite a groundswell of objection on the basis of
fairness.
Fleming, Peroni, and Shay, among others, would distinguish on fair-
ness grounds those implicit taxes paid on tax-exempt debt from ex-
plicit taxes that are required to be remitted explicitly to
governments. 51 Certainly given the intrinsic vagueness of almost any
notion of fairness it is impossible to identify a specific characteristic
that a tax system must satisfy in order to be fair, and to declare any
alternatives to be unfair. From the standpoint of the ultimate distribu-
tion of income, the question remains whether an investor who has al-
ready paid an implicit tax needs to be subject to an explicit home
country tax in the name of fairness. There is the additional considera-
50 As it happens, there appears to be insufficient demand for state and local debt among
top-bracket investors, as the implied tax rate from tax exempt bond yields is below the
35% top federal rate. See Michael J. Graetz & Deborah H. Schenk, Federal Income Taxa-
tion: Principles and Policies 224 (6th ed. 2009) (ratio of yields generally about 75%). As a
consequence, a taxable investor facing a 35% tax rate in most years receives a small wind-
fall from buying state and local debt.
51 See, e.g., Fleming et al., note 49, at 317-18.
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tion that many intuitive notions of fairness grapple rather little, if at
all, with the extraterritorial nature of worldwide income production.
On what fairness basis does foreign income production require do-
mestic taxation? And is it fair for the United States to subject income
earned in other countries to U.S. taxation, thereby quite possibly af-
fecting the distribution of income in foreign countries?
The same fairness argument that favors subjecting foreign income
to domestic income taxation would also favor subjecting foreign
value-added to domestic value-added taxation, foreign sales to domes-
tic sales taxation, and similarly extending other domestic taxes to for-
eign activities. Why is there not a groundswell of fairness-motivated
objection to the territoriality of value-added taxes, particularly in
countries such as Denmark and Hungary that boast very high domes-
tic VAT rates? In the case of the VAT, it is obvious that taxes are
largely capitalized into the prices of goods sold, so multinational firms
do not obtain extraordinary tax benefits from selling in countries with
low VAT rates, since competition pushes down final output prices in
such places. Expressed differently, one pays an implicit tax on sales in
jurisdictions with low tax rates. Exactly the same process applies to
income taxes, the only difference being that the implicit taxes are
slightly less transparent.
B. Who Pays and Who Benefits?
The analysis of CON and other welfare benchmarks is premised in
part on the notion that home countries benefit from policies that im-
prove the productivity and therefore profitability of home country
companies.5 2 While this is not a logical necessity, there are at least
two reasons why it is appropriate for the analysis to proceed on this
basis. The first is that home country residents typically have strong
stakes in the profitability of home country companies through their
interactions as owners, workers, suppliers, and consumers. Ownership
is the most obvious of these channels: The widely documented "home
bias" in asset ownership implies that domestic residents are considera-
bly more likely than others to own local companies and thereby bene-
fit from their profitability.5 3  Greater profitability is likewise
associated with higher wages and other benefits for members of the
community. The second reason comes from the analysis of Gordon,
who notes that the burden of taxation and its associated efficiency cost
52 See Desai & Hines, Tax Reform, note 6, at 493.
53 Cf. Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56 Tax
L. Rev. 537, 551 (2003) (discussing "home bias" in the context of portfolio income).
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is borne by local factors, such as labor and land.54 If a small open
economy attempts to tax foreign income at a nonzero rate, then it
discourages foreign multinational firms from investing and the cost of
this taxation is ultimately borne by local workers and landowners. 55
Hence, it is not necessary for local residents to own multinational
firms in order to be appropriately concerned about the efficiency with
which they are taxed.
It is possible to add some precision to the analysis of who bears the
burden of taxing foreign income by considering the incidence of the
corporate income tax writ large. In an open economy such as the
United States, capital taxes, of which corporate income taxes are only
one species, are largely borne by factors that are fixed in the United
States.56 In practice, this means that taxes paid by U.S. corporations,
including taxes on their foreign incomes, reduce real wages in the
United States, doing so both through direct tax burdens and also
through indirect burdens in the form of reduced aggregate economic
productivity. William Randolph estimates that 70% of the U.S. corpo-
rate income tax burden is borne by labor, but this is a lower bound
estimate. 57 Randolph's model takes world capital supplies to be
fixed, 58 which is unrealistic. Using a more appropriate specification in
which capital supply is an increasing function of real returns, the bur-




Actual tax systems are considerably more distortionary than the
stylized versions considered in this Article. Equity-financed corporate
income is taxed twice by classical corporate tax systems while debt-
financed corporate income is taxed only once, 60 investments in certain
industries and assets receive favorable tax treatment not available to
54 Roger H. Gordon, Taxation of Investment and Savings in a World Economy, 76 Am.
Econ. Rev. 1086, 1095 (1986).
55 Id. at 1096.
56 Arnold C. Harberger, The ABCs of Corporate Tax Incidence: Insights into the Open-
Economy Case, in Tax Policy and Economic Growth 51, 65 (1995); Laurence J. Kotlikoff &
Lawrence H. Summers, Tax Incidence, in 2 Handbook of Public Economics 1043 (Alan J.
Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1987).
57 William C. Randolph, International Burdens of the Corporate Income Tax 25 (Cong.
Budget Office, Working Paper No. 2006-09, 2006).
58 Id. at 8.
59 See Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Incidence, in 4 Handbook of Public
Economics, note 10, at 1787, 1833.
60 Compare IRC § 11 (imposing a tax on corporate income), and IRC §§ 301, 316 (im-
posing a shareholder-level tax on dividend distributions), with IRC § 163(a) (allowing a
corporate-level deduction for interest paid or accrued).
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other investments, 61 capital gains are taxed only upon realization, 62
and then at rates that may differ from the rates at which other income
is taxed,63 and there are many other income distinctions drawn by the
tax system with little economic basis. In addition, activities that gen-
erate positive externalities, such as those that produce new technolo-
gies with economic spillovers, those that improve the natural
environment, or others, may fail to receive appropriate encourage-
ment from the tax system in the form of subsidies or reduced tax rates.
The appropriate taxation of foreign income in an environment in
which the tax system is already imperfectly tailored to tax domestic
income may differ from the system that the government would want
to adopt if its other tax policies were optimally designed. 64 The analy-
sis nonetheless serves as a useful starting point for the design of opti-
mal tax systems, but it is worth bearing in mind that it is only a
starting point.
Tax systems that exempt foreign income have the potential to put
more pressure on aspects of the tax system, such as the transfer pric-
ing rules, that allocate income between domestic and foreign source.
In some settings with worldwide taxation, the source of income will
not matter for domestic tax purposes, hence (domestic, anyway) en-
forcement of these matters becomes an issue of little consequence. In
tax systems that exempt foreign income, the source of income and ex-
pense becomes a matter of great importance.
The difficulty of articulating and enforcing a coherent regime that
distinguishes domestic from foreign source income is certainly a chal-
lenge for those who would base taxation on this distinction. This Arti-
cle follows almost all of the preceding literature in taking enforcement
matters to be outside the scope of the present inquiry, in large part
because the traditional case for worldwide taxation is not presented in
those terms.65 And indeed, even incorporating the enforcement diffi-
culties that tax systems face, the notion of adopting worldwide taxa-
tion for no reason other than the difficulty of enforcing a transfer
pricing regime has a strong element of the transfer pricing tail wagging
the tax system dog. Certainly transfer pricing is a difficulty, and
61 See, e.g., IRC § 38(b) (detailing various favored investments that generate business
tax credits).
62 See IRC § 1001(a) (requiring a "sale or other disposition").
63 Compare IRC § 1(h) (providing capital gains rates), with IRC § 1(a) (providing rates
for ordinary income).
64 For an extended analysis of this point, see generally Hines, note 5.
65 See, e.g., Lawrence Lokken, Territorial Taxation: Why Some U.S. Multinationals
May Be Less Than Enthusiastic About the Idea (and Some Ideas They Really Dislike), 59
SMU L. Rev. 751, 757 (2006) (discussing CEN as the primary justification for worldwide
taxation).
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should be addressed on its own terms, not by changing every other
element of international taxation.
A final issue that is difficult to evaluate, but potentially important,
is the reaction of other governments to changes in U.S. tax policies. It
is standard to assume that changes in U.S. policies do not affect the
policies of other governments, but this will not be the case in some
competitive situations and if governments react strategically with each
other.66 Naturally, this consideration has the potential to change the
optimal tax policy from the standpoint of a government seeking to
maximize the welfare of its own residents, since it enhances the attrac-
tiveness of home country tax policies that encourage foreign govern-
ments to reduce their own taxation of inward foreign direct
investment. 67 Incorporating such spillovers in the choice of optimal
tax policies requires governments to determine the direction and mag-
nitude of any effects of home country tax policies on foreign tax poli-
cies. 68 While the United States is a capital exporter of sufficient size
potentially to influence the tax policies of other countries, 69 most capi-
tal exporting countries are unlikely to have such effects and therefore
may not be influenced by this consideration. And even for the United
States it is very difficult to estimate the effect of the home country tax
regime on foreign tax policies.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A reconsideration of the taxation of foreign income is long overdue.
It is surprisingly easy to grow comfortable with systems that tax for-
eign business income while providing foreign tax credits, doing so in
the vague sense that these systems promote national or world welfare.
If instead the opposite were the case, if as a result of taxing foreign
66 For articles exploring issues related to strategic setting of tax rates on foreign income
by imperfectly competitive governments, see, e.g., Eric W. Bond & Larry Samuelson, Stra-
tegic Behaviour and the Rules for International Taxation of Capital, 99 Econ. J. 1099
(1989); Martin Feldstein & David Hartman, The Optimal Taxation of Foreign Source In-
vestment Income, 93 Q.J. Econ. 613 (1979); Roger H. Gordon, Can Capital Income Taxes
Survive in Open Economies?, 47 J. Fin. 1159 (1992); Hamada, note 10; David G. Hartman,
Deferral of Taxes on Foreign Source Income, 30 Nat'l Tax J. 457 (1977); William H. Oak-
land & Yongsheng Xu, Double Taxation and Tax Deduction: A Comparison, 3 Int'l Tax &
Pub. Fin. 45 (1996).
67 See Feldstein & Hartman, note 66, at 622.
68 Id. at 621.
69 See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr. & George R. Zodrow, A Hybrid Consumption-
Based Direct Tax Proposed for Bolivia, 3 Int'l Tax & Pub. Fin. 97, 97 (1996) (documenting
the reluctance of the government of Bolivia to introduce a cash-flow style corporate in-
come tax due to its potential noncreditability by U.S. investors in Bolivia). Case-specific
tax provisions, such as individually-negotiated tax holidays, are more likely to be influ-
enced by home country tax rules. See, e.g., Hines, note 19 (reporting evidence concerning
the effect of "tax sparing" on local tax rates in developing countries).
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income the welfare of domestic residents is gradually eroded as do-
mestic business operations become less productive and less dynamic,
it might not be immediately apparent in what is otherwise a strong
and affluent economy. This is a potential danger for large economies
that persist in taxing foreign income without regard to the resulting
distortions to ownership and productivity. Whereas some forms of in-
ternational taxation, such as subjecting U.S. firms to U.S. excise taxes
on their foreign sales, are transparently inefficient and self-defeating,
others, such as the current U.S. regime of taxing foreign income, are
no less inefficient, only somewhat subtler in their appearance.
As long as governments persist in taxing business income at source
there also will be a need to determine the appropriate residence-based
taxation of business income. No single system produces efficient in-
centives at all margins of behavior, since there are so many business
activities that are taxed in so many different ways. It is clear, how-
ever, that ownership is very important, and that international owner-
ship is strongly influenced by taxation. In a context of shifting
ownership, there are significant costs associated with subjecting active
foreign business income to home country taxation, and these costs are
not somehow recouped by preventing the outflow of what otherwise
would be domestic economic activity, since foreign business opera-
tions if anything increase demand for domestic operations. Hence the
feared loss of domestic tax base that might accompany exemption of
foreign income is illusory. Viewing foreign taxation through the lens
of ownership, itself just a small change in perspective on international
taxation, has the potential to clarify the issues facing governments that
tax business income.
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